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Economic Perspective 1 
ROYAL DOCKMRDS: TIME FOR ACTION 
Gavin Kennedy 
Defence Finance Unit, Heriot-Watt University 
THE STATE OF THE DEBATE 
That t h e r e i s a case for changes in the 
way the Royal Dockyards a re managed, and 
the way the employed workforce goes about 
the t a xpa ye r s ' b u s i n e s s , i s probably the 
only th ing a l l p a r t i e s t o the c u r r e n t 
d i s c u s s i o n s on c o m m e r c i a l c o n t r a c t 
management agree about . Indeed, the 
t rade unions, while giving evidence to the 
House of Commons Defence Committee in 
June , on more than one occas ion assured 
MPs t h a t they did not t h ink t h a t the 
s t a t u s quo could con t inue , though they 
were u n s p e c i f i c as t o what changes, i f 
any. they saw as l ike ly to be forthcoming 
from the i r s ide . 
Much of the c r i t i c i sm of the Secretary of 
S t a t e for Defence, Mr H e s e l t i n e , has 
concentrated on the procedural rather than 
the substantive issues associated with the 
l a t e s t f lurry of reports on the future of 
the dockyards. By c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the 
not unimportant issue of the lack of time 
for consultation (nominally 12 weeks, but 
much l e s s in f a c t ) , t he t r a d e union and 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t y w i t n e s s e s (some of them 
overlapping in s ta tus) convinced the House 
of Commons Defence Committee t o i s s u e a 
unanimous c r i t i c i s m of the M i n i s t e r ' s 
(mis)handl ing of h i s p roposa l s for q u i t e 
r a d i c a l , and u n p r e c e d e n t e d , dockyard 
reform (House of Comons Paper, No 453, 
1985). The Publ ic Accounts Committee 
(House of Commons Paper No 44, 1985) a l s o 
expressed s c e p t i c i s m a t the f i n a n c i a l 
sav ings the Min i s t ry expected from i t s 
con t r ac to r i s a t ion plans. 
Old h a n d s among o b s e r v e r s of t h e 
pa r l i amen ta ry p rocess w i l l recognise the 
well-worn technique of opposing something 
i n d i r e c t l y by f i r s t a t tack ing i t s timing 
ra ther than i t s content, and, i f tha t does 
not give the Minister, or fa i l ing tha t h is 
nervous colleagues, cold feet , then going 
on to at tack ha i r - r a i s ing , but nonetheless 
hypothet ical , consequences of the content 
i t s e l f . In W h i t e h a l l , ' d e a t h by a 
thousand e x c e p t i o n s ' , has seen off more 
than one reforming p roposa l , A c l o s e 
reading of the union evidence ('Giving the 
Royal Dockyards a Chance', December 1984), 
t he i r submissions to the Defence Committee 
(House of Commons paper No 453), and media 
comment by the local MPs. suggests that a 
typical 'snow job' i s underway. 
Mr Heselt ine must defend himself for h is 
management of h i s r e f o r m p r o p o s a l s . 
However, most of the resentment a t the way 
the issue has been handled i s a diversion 
from the main question: what can be done 
about the Royal Dockyards in a shor t 
enough time scale to make a difference to 
t he i r manifest problems, a l l of which have 
been known s ince the Mallabar committee 
reported in 1971 (Cmnd 4713). 
Those who have jo ined t h i s debate only 
recently may be surprised to know jus t how 
many t i m e s t h e d o c k y a r d s have been 
examined and found w a n t i n g , and, as 
p e r t i n e n t l y , have been found wanting for 
precisely the same reasons as were pointed 
out by Sir John Mallabar in 1971. I t i s , 
t h e r e f o r e , somewhat disengenuous for the 
o p p o n e n t s of a c t u a l , a s opposed t o 
a b s t r a c t , change in the dockyards to 
r e q u i r e more t ime for d i s c u s s i o n when 
d i s c u s s i o n has been underway for fifteen 
y e a r s . W h i l e n o t e n d o r s i n g Mr 
H e s e l t i n e ' s s t y l e of management , I 
u n d e r s t a n d h i s f e a r s t h a t a n o t h e r 
prolonged bout of i n t e r n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n 
and ni t -picking n e g o t i a t i o n s would do to 
h i s Apr i l 1985 p roposa l s (Defence Open 
Government Document 85/01: The Future of 
t h e Royal D o c k y a r d s : a c o n s u l t a t i v e 
document for employees) what the unions 
and c i v i l s e r v i c e did to the Mallabar 
proposals of 1971 and the Speed proposals 
of 1980 ( 'The Royal Dockya rds : A 
67 
Framework for the Future', 2 Vols). 
The plain fact i s tha t the unions prefer 
to leave the dockyards more or l ess as 
they are , and such change as they are 
grudgingly prepared to accept now, (the 
Trading Fund proposals for example), is a 
tactical stance to prevent changes which 
challenge their relatively soft conditions 
of service, l e ss than onerous working 
pract ices and the i r c iv i l service index-
l inked pension e n t i t l e m e n t s . Self 
interest, as Adam Smith explained, is one 
of the most powerful mot iva to r s of 
behaviour, but collective self interest i s 
even more powerful and experience suggests 
that i t i s also normally against the 
public interest, leaving the onus on those 
who espouse i t to demonstrate that the i r 
version is a social benefit. 
REFORM PROPOSALS SINCE 1971 
The Mallabar committee was set up in 1968 
to report on the Royal Dockyards and other 
Government owned indus t r i a l enterpr ises . 
I t found tha t there were 'symptoms of an 
unhealthy situation* in the operation of 
the yards, such as high levels of overtime 
working, combined with high leve ls of 
'waiting t ime' (tradesmen standing about 
waiting for another trade to undertake 
work before they could themselves 
continue), and generally low productivity. 
In other words, the typical s i tua t ion 
prevailing in much of UK industry which 
prompted the kind of revisions of working 
pract ices demonstrated in the Fawley 
productivity agreements and many others. 
Mallabar thought t h a t c e r t a i n unique 
features of the naval dockyards added to 
the i r problems. For example, there was 
no clear d i s t inc t ion between the Royal 
Dockyards as a managerial ent i ty and the 
sole customer for whom they worked, ie 
the Royal Navy. This precluded the 
development of self-confident managers in 
the yards. In addit ion, the confusion 
(to put i t mildly) of the internal costing 
systems, designed more for parliamentary 
procedures (the annual 'Votes') than for 
managerial decision making and performance 
evaluation, inhibited the development of 
modern managerial s k i l l s . If nobody 
knows exac t ly what i t c o s t s to do 
anything nobody can be sure that changes 
improve efficiency. 
All wages and conditions, manning levels 
and recruitment are decided not by the 
managers of the yards on the basis of 
d e c i s i o n s for which they would be 
accountable nor in consultation with the 
local trade unions, but by a central ised 
bargaining process (the Whitley councils) 
between the civi l service and unions that 
set national standards i r respect ive of 
local circumstances. Add in the bouts of 
incomes policy during 1964-1978 and the 
consequences were predictable. This 
undermined local managerial authority. 
Mallabar examined the pos s ib i l i t i e s for 
reform and s e t out the problems of 
implementation. As a l l of these options 
are s t i l l on the table i t makes sense to 
note Mallabar's conclusions. A reversion 
to full naval control was rejected on the 
grounds that the Royal Navy did not have 
the appropriate managerial ski l ls and that 
such a move did nothing for the desired 
separation of the dockyards from the sole 
customer. Transfer of work into private 
shipyards was excluded on the grounds that 
t he re were ' i n s u f f i c i e n t f a c i l i t i e s ' 
available for such a t ransfer . Nor was 
i t feas ib le , in Mallabar's view, for 
private cap i ta l to take over the yards (a 
'friend in the City' informed him there 
was no i n t e r e s t in such a ven tu re ! ) . 
In te res t ing ly , in view of the current 
Heseltine proposals, the idea of agency 
management was rejected on the grounds of 
the unsatisfactory experience of such 
arrangements during the 1939-45 war, often 
quoted by trade union c r i t i c s of the 
M i n i s t e r . S e t t i n g up a p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n t o manage t h e y a r d s 
(nat ional isa t ion) was rejected on the 
grounds that i t would not be competitive 
enought to ensure 'value for money'. 
Mallabar's preferred option was a Trading 
Fund and he recommended a target date of 
1971* for i t s establishment. This idea 
had the backing of the Fulton Report (Cmnd 
3638, 1968) and gained par l i amenta ry 
approval in the Government Trading Funds 
Act of 1973. Trading Funds were 
fashionable and they were recommended for 
the Royal Mint, the Royal Ordnance 
Factories, the Royal Dockyards, HMSO, and 
the Property Services Agency. I t would 
not be unfair to report that the trade 
unions were (and remain) suspicious of 
proposals to h ive-of f c i v i l s e rv i ce 
activit ies into Trading Funds. They are 
seen as precusors of pr iva t i sa t ion (eg 
the Royal Ordnance). 
Under a Trading Fund the dockyards would 
be required to earn a revenue 'taking one 
year with another', suff icient to cover 
the i r outgoings, inc luding a c a p i t a l 
charge for assets and f a c i l i t i e s . The 
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s taff would be outside the c iv i l service 
e s t ab l i shment and, t hus , immune to 
politically inspired 'number cutting1, but 
the dockyards would also be independent 
e n t i t i e s and hence v u l n e r a b l e t o 
' p r iva t i sa t ion ' . In the l igh t of these 
features, current trade union willingness 
to accept Trading Fund s ta tus for the 
dockyards i s ambivalent and l a r g e l y 
tact ical . 
However, Mallabar's proposals for Trading 
Fund status did not come to fruition. In 
fact , the date for establishing such a 
fund slipped back, f i r s t from April 1974 
to April 1976 and then to April 1978, as 
the civil service found ' d i f f i c u l t i e s ' in 
se t t ing one up. The new Conservative 
Government in 1979 set up another enquiry, 
under the navy minister , Keith Speed, to 
examine the ' c r i s i s in the dockyards'. 
He reported favourably on the Trading Fund 
s o l u t i o n and followed Mallabar in 
r e j e c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s , inc luding 
commercial management. 
Meanwhile, the former Defence and External 
Affairs Committee of the House of Commons 
(24 July 1973, October 1975, December 
1976), i t s successor the Defence Committee 
(2nd Report, Session 1980-81), and from 
time to time the Public Accounts Committee 
(22nd Report, Session 1983-84, June 1984) 
pursued the subject of what had happened 
to the proposals for reform and found a 
continuing fa i lu re to tackle anything 
substant ia l . A number of minor changes 
that were introduced ended in fa i lu re : 
the incentive scheme on a t r i a l basis at 
Chatham dockyard in 1976, and the Dockyard 
Efficiency Scheme in 1981, which from 
current reports has also failed to ra ise 
productivity. In this respect, a comment 
by the Defence Committee that incentive 
schemes in the dockyards were "corrupted 
by the negot ia t ing process* w i l l not 
surprise anybody familiar with industrial 
r e l a t i o n s i n h i g h l y p r o t e c t e d 
establishments. 
THE PROBLEMS 
The Royal Dockyards exist to service ships 
and submarines of the Royal Navy and to 
ensure t h a t the f l e e t i s a v a i l a b l e 
o p e r a t i o n a l l y to meet t he navy ' s 
assignments. Modern naval ships and 
submarines are formidably complex in their 
s t r u c t u r e s and in the warf ight ing 
equipment they carry. About 60% of a 
modern ship's cost is accounted for by i t s 
sophisticated electronics and warfighting 
capacity. A r e f i t of a Polaris c lass 
nuclear submarine c o s t s around £300 
million and a modern fr igate r e f i t can 
cost upwards of £50 million. 
The two dockyards, Rosyth and Devonport, 
had estimated production costs of £537 
million in 1983-84 (Statement on the 
Defence Estimates, 1985, Cmnd 9430-11). 
Rosyth, the smaller of the two yards, 
employs 8,500 people, providing a quarter 
of a l l employment in the Dunfermline area. 
Devonport employs 13,100 people out of 
32,000 employed in manufacturing in 
Plymouth. The managerial challenges that 
these organisations face can be guaged by 
noting that there are only about 100 
ind iv idua l e s t ab l i shmen t s in the UK 
employing on s i t e more people than the 
Rosyth dockyard. 
The relat ionship between the Royal Navy 
and the Royal Dockyards i s regarded by 
dockyard management (and acknowledged by 
the Royal Navy) as being detrimental to 
efficiency. This i s partly the result of 
the difficulty in predicting the extent of 
the work tha t wi l l be required during a 
r e f i t un t i l the equipment on the ship is 
stripped out. This does not matter too 
much in an operational sense, but with 
budgetary restraint, and in circumstances 
where the Admiralty wishes to move 
resources from support to the front l ine ' , 
the unforeseen element of refitting cannot 
remain immune to controls. 
Some c r i t i c s of commercial management 
believe that the unforeseen element in a 
ref i t precludes fixed cost contracting and 
would lead to a cost-plus pricing, a 
notorious means to extravagance. The 
Chief Executive, Royal Dockyards, Admiral 
A S George, believes that the unforeseen 
element , with proper and commercial 
management techniques, can be reduced from 
about 30% towards '\0%, and the 10J can be 
handled by ind iv idua l fixed pr ice 
contracts negotiated between a new Navy 
Board contract negotiating function (which 
i s being set up anyway) and commercial 
managers (Evidence to the Defence 
Committee, July 1985). 
Another problem aris ing from the 'cosy' 
re la t ionship between the Navy and the 
dockyards i s t h a t of emergency work 
demanded from the dockyards, on the 
ins t ruc t ions of the Royal Navy, without 
penal ty for the cos t s of disruption. 
This can account for 10$ of the dockyard's 
workload. Commercial management would 
force the navy to confront the costs of 
th i s work and make choices about the 
69 
alternative use of naval resources. This 
too is welcomed by the dockyard managers 
(Ibid). 
Overtime working i s i n e v i t a b l e in a 
maintenance function but whether i t needs 
to be paid for ( thus producing an 
incentive to create i t ) i s another matter. 
Commercial companies elsewhere in the UK 
have eliminated paid overtime, and i t s 
attendant abuse, by time off in l i eu 
schemes based on a guaranteed annual 
salary. That the dockyards, as l a t e as 
1984 were s t i l l trying to contain overtime 
(about 14% of a l l hours worked) by 
executive exhortation i s i tself a comment 
on the need for change. 
As long ago as the Fawley productivity 
agreements of 1970, symptoms of a 
workforce d e m o r a l i s e d by l a c k of 
applicat ion and a r t i f i c i a l r e s t r i c t i v e 
practices were well documented. The fact 
that the dockyards' industr ia l employees 
have an absenteeism ra te 40% above the 
national average (19 days off a year 
compared to 13 elsewhere) s ign i f ies the 
effects of high overtime and high waiting 
time on the commitment of the employees. 
The l a t t e r i s the r e su l t of r e s t r i c t i v e 
practices, many of which have already been 
foregone in those businesses where losses 
lead inevitably to redundancies. 
The scope for productivity improvements 
was noted in the Peat Marwick study 
commissioned by Plymouth City Council 
(Defence Committee, HC Paper 453). 
Labour performance at Devonport, measured 
on British Standards Insti tute principles, 
allowing for 'normal relaxation, clean-up, 
walking time, waiting time and other 
contingencies', should produce work at 100 
performance on the BSI scale. Actual 
performance is about 75 (implying a not 
too onerous e f f o r t ) and t h e r e f o r e an 
improvement of over 20% in productivity in 
the dockyard i s a t ta inab le . Within the 
current regime, however, i t i s not being 
achieved. In the Falklands emergency the 
dockyards did as much welding in a week as 
they normally do in four months. 
THE COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT OPTION 
The Minister of Defence, Mr Heseltine, has 
i n i t i a t ed a number of changes within the 
Ministry to sharpen up i t s performance and 
to shi f t resources within the defence 
budget towards more effective 'front line' 
capabi l i ty . These changes have been 
underway since he assumed office not 
longer after the Falklands emergency. 
They involve managerial changes at the top 
of the Ministry, increased accountability 
for the use of resources a t a l l levels 
(the MINIS system) and a shift of emphasis 
away from in-house operations to various 
forms of exposu re t o compe t i t i ve 
pressures. 
I t i s not surprising that he turned his 
attention to the Royal Dockyards. Nor is 
i t surprising that having read through al l 
the previous reports he decided that 
action was a more effective antidote to 
the i r manifest problems than yet more 
enquiries. His then personal advisor, Mr 
Levine, undertook a swift survey of the 
options facing the dockyards and reported 
that the commercial management option was 
the one most likely to achieve the sought 
for r e su l t s . The Levine memorandum (9 
February 1984) was 'leaked' to the unions 
not long a f t e r i t was on r e s t r i c t e d 
circulation in the Ministry and, while i t 
remains unpublished, e x t r a c t s have 
appeared in various places. 
The commercial agency proposals were the 
Minister 's preferred option. In fact , 
the Minister has announced he intends to 
proceed with th i s option with a vesting 
day of 1 Apr i l 1987. B r i e f l y , the 
Government would continue to own the 
physical assets of the dockyards and to be 
responsible for capi ta l investment in 
them. There would also be provision for 
emergency requis i t ion of the yards under 
direct Ministry control if circumstances 
arose n e c e s s i t a t i n g such a measure. 
These steps meet, in the Minister's view, 
a l l the reserve powers needed in respect 
of national security. 
Several commercial companies are currently 
in discussion with the Ministry with a 
view to the submission of a detai led 
prospectus and, as i s usual in contracts 
of this size, with proof of capability and 
financial soundness for taking over the 
commercial management of the dockyards, 
including the workforce and the work in 
progress. Employing Companies wi l l be 
established, separate from the Ministry 
and the contractors , as 'labour only* 
companies, and a l l employees of the two 
dockyards would be permanently established 
with one of the companies (one for each 
yard). Their current conditions of work 
would be protected within each company. 
The contractor would use the manpower 
resources of the e x i s t i n g Employing 
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Company and be responsible for i t being 
adequately funded for wages and such like 
(recovering the costs from the prices 
quoted to the Ministry for r e f i t t i ng 
work). The Minister would have residual 
powers to inf luence the Employing 
Companies, but would generally have an 
'arms length1 relationship with them. 
The r a t h e r complicated r e l a t i o n s h i p 
envisaged ar i ses largely from the many 
considerations involved in t h i s unique 
experiment in commercial management of the 
dockyards, which must, for prac t ica l 
r e a s o n s of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , 
con t inu i ty of employment, n a t i o n a l 
security and public concern, take account 
of far more factors than would be normal 
in a s t ra igh t p r iva t i sa t ion option (see 
Briefing Paper, No 12. The Concept of 
Employing Companies, MOD in HC 453). 
The successful contractors (one for each 
yard) would be assured of about 705 of the 
core work of the Royal Navy, and would 
compete for additional work with private 
yards. This introduces a competitive 
edge into the dockyards and requires 
improved performance if they wish to work 
up to their capacities. 
Separate from th i s exercise, though not 
ent i re ly uninfluenced by i t , there i s to 
be a rundown of establishment at Devonport 
of 2,000 jobs and a t Rosyth of about 400 
before 1987. From 1987 the yards are 
required to modernise t h e i r working 
methods and reduce the i r operating costs 
to make them competitive with outside 
c o n t r a c t o r s in p r i v a t e yards . The 
Minister, in the longer run, can vary the 
amount of core work guaranteed to the 
contractors, thus putting pressure on the 
commercial managers if their performance 
i s not sa t isfactory. He also has the 
sanction of not renewing the contract a t 
the end of each f ive yea r s , and, in 
ul t imate emergency, of taking the yard 
over if circumstances, such as commercial 
default, warrant i t . 
From the Royal Navy's point of view the 
change to commercial management in the 
dockyards and competitive tendering for 
20% of the ref i t work is worthwhile if i t 
reduces refitting costs and releases funds 
for a l te rna t ive uses within the defence 
budget. Th is , however, cannot be 
guaranteed in advance under any managerial 
regime. To date the Public Accounts 
Committee is unconvinced that costs will 
be reduced more than marginally. The 
Navy Board thinks they will be reduced at 
most by up to £30 million a year ( less 
than 6% of t o t a l costs) ; the PCA. not 
unused to halving 'loaded' forecasts by 
Government departments, thinks i t more 
likely to be less than 3J. 
CONCLUSION 
Radical proposals for change are bound to 
provoke fierce resistance from those who 
be l i eve t h a t they w i l l be adverse ly 
affected. The dockyard proposals meet 
a l l the c r i t e r i a for scep t i c i sm by 
col lec t ive in t e res t groups. They wil l 
force changes that up to now have been 
avoided either by a withering of political 
w i l l or by a wel l fought rea r -guard 
ac t i on . Some of the r e s i s t a n c e i s 
ideological (opposition to privatisation), 
some of i t a result of genuine concern for 
national security (dockyard employees are 
a l l of vetted s ta tus ) , and some of i t a 
product of prospective loss of privilege. 
At base the real issue i s whether the 
Royal Navy gets the best service i t s 
restricted budget can afford. 
Of a l l the a l te rna t ives avai lable , I 
believe the commercial management option 
i s the one most l ike ly to meet the Royal 
Navy's needs and the best interests of the 
employees of the dockyards, securing for 
them long-term job p rospec t s , more 
interesting work and a more respectful use 
of thei r s k i l l s than the present regime 
which underuses their time. 
At the time of Mallabar there were four UK 
naval dockyards. The procrastination and 
refusal to reform has seen two of them 
close down. If, another ten years on, 
the two remaining dockyards have not 
responded to the challenge of change, i t 
may well be t h a t the UK w i l l end up 
without i t s dockyards, with consequential 
damage to i t s defence stance. Those 
currently concentrating on the negative 
aspects of change, and not i t s immense 
opportunities, might like to explain what 
future they see in the UK dockyards if 
commercial management i s rejected, and 
some MPs might care to explain what their 
party 's defence pol ic ies , in respect of 
the Polaris and Trident programmes, will 
do for dockyard employment within the next 
five years, with or without change. 
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